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In State (DeHart) v. Good Will Hook and Ladder Co., 40
Atl. 570 (Supreme Court of New Jersey), it appeared that the
prosecutor had been expelled from the defendant
By-Laws,
Expulsion of company, under a by-law which provided that
"any member of the company who shall be
Member
guilty of an act whereby the reputation of the company may
be injured, witnessed by any member, may be punished by
expulsion." DeHart had been chairman of a building committee which was discharged, and a new one appointed, as he
alleged, illegally. He therefore refused to turn over to the
new committee funds which he held as chairman. For this
he was expelled. It was held that his expulsion was not
authorized by the by-law, as it could only be taken to apply
to acts of moral turpitude.
BANKRUPTCY.

In Tompkins v. Hazen (Supreme Court, Appellate Division),
51 N.Y. Suppl. 1003, the question was as to the sufficiency
Discharge

of a promise to revive a debt barred by a discharge

Revival of
Debt,
Sufficiency of

in bankruptcy. The promise was in the following words: "If you will only wait-hold on a
little longer-until the New York folks pay me,

Promise

then I will pay you."

It was admitted that this

promise, by reason of the condition attached, was not sufficient unless it could be shown that the condition was performed or waived. In order to prove a waiver, a subsequent
series of small payments was shown, some accompanied by
letters which made no reference to the condition, but which,
on the other hand, did not absolutely promise to pay more,
merely expressing a hope of ability to continue payments.
The majority held that these payments, together with the
letters which made no reference to the condition of the
original promise, were "inconsistent with an intention upon
his part to insist upon the condition which he had previously
imposed," and that " upon the evidence, the jury were authorized to find that the defendant waived any condition which
he had imposed, and intended in any event to pay the debt."
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BILLS AND NOTES.

Simmons v. Thompson (Supreme Court, Appellate Division),
5' N. Y. Suppl. ioi8. A trust company had made large
Corporations, loans to an improvement company to build a railFurther loans being necessary and the
Agreement road.
trust company refusing to make them unless it
Against
Liability
could be secured from the criticism which previous
loans had excited, the defendant,. secretaiy of, tfhe railroad,
was induced to give the promissory note in question upon the
vice-president of the trust company, promising that the maker
would not be called upon to pay, it merely being held as
"apparent security."
"Upon that state of facts, the defendant insisted that his
case was controlled by the rule of law that it is a defence to
the enforcement of a promissory note against the- maker, in
the hands of an original party to it, that the note was without
consideration, and was delivered upon condition that the
maker should not be liable thereon," and the majority thought
the case was "clearly within the rule."
Ingraham, J., dissented on the ground that to admit evidence of the oral agreement of the vice-president was contrary
to the parol evidence rule.
A case peculiar in its facts and a decision which seems
questionable under the previous New York decisions are found
in Oneida County Bank v. Lewis (Supreme Court,
irregular
Indorsement, Appellate Division), 51 N. Y. Suppl. 826. A and
B were joint makers of a note, and B's name also
Circuity of
Action
appeared as an irregular indorser. The note came
into the hands of the plaintiff bank, and being unpaid was
taken up by C, an indorser whose name appears prior to the
indorsement of B, and judgment obtained in the name of the
bank against A. The judgment against A being a bar to a
judgment against B as maker, it was sought to charge the
latter on his liability as indorser; but B defended on the
ground that C, being the real plaintiff, and being a prior
indorser, would, as between themselves, be ultimately liable.
The court, after noting that the order of the indorser's names
on the paper is not necessarily the order of their liability
where one of them is irregular, continued as follows: " In the
case at bar B was one of the makers of the note, and
ultimately liable for it; and it would seem to me a legal
inference that, in indorsing the note, he became liable as the
indorser before C . . . although, as a matter of fact, Cross-

man's name may have been placed upon the note before that
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of Lewis; otherwise, independent of any discharge of Lewis
as maker, there would be a succession of rights leading to
circuitous and unnecessary actions." Judgment for plaintiff.
In United States Bank of Omaha v. Geer, 75 N. W. io88,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed its former ruling
(73 N. W. 266; 53 Neb. 67) and held that a
Negotiable
Instruments, certificate of deposit indorsed by the payee " Pay
Restrictive
Indorsement,
Parol
Evidence

to the order of R. C. 0. cash, for account" of the

indorser, is a restrictive indorsement, vests no
general property to the paper in the indorsee, but
merely constitutes him an agent for the purpose of collecting ;
and parol evidence is not admissible to establish that the
transfer of title was absolute. The reversal seems to be in
accordance with the authorities and correct in principle. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Reno Bank, 3 Fed. 257 (880), Sweeny
v. Easter, i Wall. 166 (1863); Hoffman v. Bank, 46 N.J.
Law, 605 (1884); While v. Bank, l02 U. S. 658 (188o);.
Freeman'sNat'l Bank v.National Tube Works, 151 Mass.413
(189o). Three judges dissented.

CARRIERS.

Perhaps the courts of the various states of this country arenearly equally divided as to the question: What is the nature
of the liability of a carrier when the goods have
Arrival of
arrived at their place of destination and have been
Goods at
Destination
deposited in a warehouse? One line of cases,
Carrier's
Subsequent including Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, hold
Liability I that the common carriers' special liability ceases
eo instanti, while in New Hampshire, New York and other
states the opposite view prevails and the special liability is
declared to continue for a reasonable time after arrival.
The question has arisen for the first time in West Virginia,
in Berry et al. v. W. V & P. R. R., 30 S. E. 143, where the
latter rule was followed and the railroad was held to its
common carrier's liability for a reasonable time after the goods
had been stored. The vexed question as to whether notice of
arrival of the goods must be given by the railroad to the consignee was answered in the negative by the West Virginia
Court.
When goods are delivered to a common carrier a strong
presumption arises that they are for immediate shipment, and
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the burden is on the carrier to prove that he did
not receive the goods in his capacity as common
carrier, but merely as a warehouseman to await
Carrier's
Liability,
further instructions from the shipper before sendPresumption ing them. The Supreme Court of North Caro!ina
held that it was error to decide, as a matter of law, that the
following letter, sent with the go~ods'to aa-ailroad station, was
not sufficient to shift the burden of proof: "1
Freight AgentDear Sir. . . . will you mark them [the goods] prepaid?
I will be at the depot to-morrow, and get the bill of lading
and pay the freight. B." The question as to the capacity in
which the railroad received the goods should have been submitted to the jury: Berry v. Southernz Rwy. CO., 30 S. E. 14.
Faircloth, C. J., dissented.
Goods,
Delivery

to

The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit has recently decided that where the agent of a connecting carrier
has, by mistake, offered a shipper an unusually
Interstate
Commerce
low rate on a shipment of an unusual character,
Law,
and the initial carrier, in ignorance of the rate,
Violation
breaks its contract of carriage by sending the
goods over a different road from that inserted in the bills of
lading, thus subjecting the shipper to the payment of a much
higher rate of freight than that contracted for, the initial
carrier cannot escape liability to the shipper for damages, on
the ground that the rate given was in violation of the interstate commerce law: Pond-Decker Lumber Co. v. SPencer, 86
Fed. 846.
A decision of general interest has lately been handed down
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, determining the relation
Passenger, existing between a sleeping car company and the
Paliure to
railroad over whose lines its cars are run. Plaintiff
Put Off,
Pullman Co., took a berth in a Pullman car on the T. & P. R. R.,
Railroad,
the conductor promising to let her off at Cypress
Liability
Station. Before Cypress was reached the conductors and Pullman porters on the train were changed, and
the new T. & P. conductor asked the Pullman car porter who
had been on duty whether there were any passengers to get
off at Cypress, to which the porter replied "No," forgetting
about plaintiff. It was impossible for the conductor to find
out in any other manner, since he could not arouse the sleeping passengers to ask them their destinations. Plaintiff was
.therefore carried beyond Cypress Station and was put to
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expense and inconvenience in returning, to recover which this
action was brought against the Pullman Company and the
T. & P. R. R.
It was held that the T. & P. R. R. was liable for the negligent acts of the Pullman Company's servants, seemingly on
the theory of agency. "The negligence of the porter or
conductor of the palace car was the negligence of the railroad
company. We are constrained to hold that the failure in duty
of the Pullman porter was chargeable to defendant:" Airey v.
Pullman Palace Car Co. et al., 2 3 So. 512.
CONSPIRACY.

In Sherman v. Doran et al. (Supreme Court, Appellate
Division), 51 N. Y. Suppl. 731, the complaint charged that
plaintiff had obtained a patent in United States on
Patent,
Decisionof
a suspender clasp and intended to patent it in
Arbitrators Canada, but that defendants learning of the details
of the device applied for a Canadian patent; that when plaintiff made a similar application, an arbitration board was
appointed; that through false swearing of defendants and their
witnesses a decision adverse to plaintiff was given and a
patent issued accordingly; that plaintiff through the issue of
the Canadian patent to defendants had lost large sums. The
court decided that as the gist of the action was the damage
sustained, it devolved on the plaintiff to show that he would
have secured the patent but for the defendants' perjury, and
that as this would involve a review of the points passed on by
the arbitrators, the proper mode was by an appeal from their
decision, and not by a collateral attack on an award which
was entitled to the solemnity of a judicial decision. It was
further said: "There is no difference in principle between this
case as thus presented and an action for a conspiracy against
persons who have recovered a judgment against a plaintiff on
false and perjured testimony. Upon principle and considerations of public policy it is manifest that such an action ought
not to lie while the judgment stands."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A woman cannot act as notary public in Ohio: State v.
Adams (S. C. Ohio), 51 N. E. 135. The court founds its
Notary Public, decision on sec. 4, art. i5, and sec. I, art. 5 of the
Eligibility of Ohio Constitution, which provide that every officer
Women
must be an elector and every elector a male. The
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Act April 26, 1898, to amend sec. I Io Rev. Stat. (93 Laws,
405) is thus rendered ineffectual of its purpose. The old act
had provided "the governor may appoint . . . as notaries
public as many persons having the quaficationsof electors,"
etc. The italicized phrase was omitted in the amended section.
The Supreme Court of Ohio decides that the business of
plumbing is so nearly related to-the public health as to be
Police Power, constitutionally regulated by law: State v.Gardner,
Plumbers,
51 N. E, 136.
The court says, "We are aware
Public Health that an opinion prevails in some quarters, and has
found expression in judicial utterances, that the pursuit of
plumbing is a mere trade, which may be easily mastered by
any one possessed of ordinary intelligence; that the plumber
is not, nor is he expected to be, an expert in the science of
sanitation; and hence his work cannot have such relation to
the public health as to justify its regulation." In rejecting
such aspersions upon the plumber, the court follows the
authorities: Peo. v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529 (1895); Singer v.
State, 72 Md. 464 (189o). The Act of April 26, 1896, "to
promote the public health and regulate ,the sanitary
construction of house-drainage and plumbing," requiring
Uniformity plumbers, masters or journeymen to take out
licenses, but allowing all members of firms to
engage in the business where only one member has a license,
and all members of corporations, though only the manager is
licensed, is unconstitutional for lack of uniformity.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, after the cases of Central
Trust Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 80 Fed. 218 (1897); IndianStreet Railways, apolis Street Railway Cases, 82 Fed. I (1897),
Regulation of and City of Indianapolisv. Central Trust Co., 27
Fares
C. C. A. 58; 83 Fed. 529 (1897), deciding
unconstitutional the act regulating the street railway fares of
Indianapolis, has, nevertheless, reaffirmed its original opinion
that the act is constitutional: City of Indianaolis v. Nevin,
51 N. E. 8o.
In State v. Harbourne, 4o Atl. 179, defendant, the local
manager of the Western Union Telegraph Company, was
indicted for receiving a message in Waterbury,
Telegraph
Company, Connecticut, and transmitting it to Jersey City,
Message
for New Jersey, the message authorizing a company
Gambling
Purposes,
in New Jersey to place a bet on a horse race for
Interstate
Commerce

the sender, and being contrary to a Connecticut
statute, Publ. Acts, 1893, p. 240. The only de-
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fence was that the statute was unconstitutional, as amounting
to an attempt to regulate interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in an able opinion by
Hall, J., showed clearly that the statute was a mere exercise
of the police power and was valid. " It simply prohibits in
this state the business of aiding crime; and, if such commerce
is thereby affected at all, it is the incidental effect of depriving
those here engaged in telegraphing of the profits they might
make through the business of promoting gambling in this
state."
CONTRACTS.

The owner of a line of vessels running between New York
and the West Indies sold the good-will thereof and covenanted
"to do no business with such port in or from any
Restraint of
Trade,
place in the United States east of the MissisReasonableness sippi."
In a suit growing out of this contract,
it was insisted that the covenant was an unreasonable restraint
of trade but the court took the opposite view: Brett v. Ebel
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division), 5 1 N. Y. Suppl 573.
Defendant became a salesman of plaintiff in the wine business under a contract which, inter alia, provided, that for ten
Stipulation years the defendant "shall not in any manner,
Not to Engage directly or indirectly, engage or employ himself in
in Business, any other business with, or for any person or
Enforcement, persons other than the firm [plaintiff] during the
injunction
continuance of this agreement."
Romer, J., in the Divisional Court, held that there was nothing by which the court could be forced to construe this stipulation with reference merely to the wine business, and that it
was unreasonable to prohibit defendant from engaging in any
other business for ten years. Therefore an injunction would
not issue to restrain defendant from serving another wine
merchant, for which position he had left plaintiff: Ehrman v.
Bartholomew [1898], 1 Ch. 676.
Defendant, in Savannah, employed plaintiff to make contracts for the sale of cotton in New York, delivery to be made
in the future. It was shown that defendant had
Wagering
Contract,
no intention of fulfilling the contracts, relying on
Sale of
plaintiff to avoid this contingency, but that it was
Futures
simply a scheme to profit by the difference in
values arising under the contracts in the New York market
before the time for delivery arrived.
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Held, that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was
a "gaming" contract under the Georgia Code, § 3671, and
that it was, moreover, void as a wagering contract, according
to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States :
Waldron et at. v.Johnston (Circ. Ct. S. D. Ga.), 86 Fed. 757.
CORPORATIONS.

The Status of Limited Partnership Associations, organized
under the Pennsylvania Statute of June 2, 1874, formed the
Essential basis of a lengthy opinion in the case of AndrewsAttributes, Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., Ltd., 86 Fed.
Ultra Vires (Ohio) 585, April I i, 1898. The court, Lurton,
Circuit Judge, after a comprehensive review of all the authorities in point, reached the conclusion that the only essential
attributes of a corporation is the capacity to exist and act with
the powers granted, as a legal entity, apart from the individual
or individuals who constitute its members. Suit was brought
by the coke company, a citizen of Pennsylvania, against the defendant, a citizen of Ohio, in the Circuit Court, for a large
amount of coke sold by an unauthorized agent of the plaintiff
to the defendant. The court refused to admit the defence ofultra
vires, although the contract was not made in accordance with
the terms of the plaintiff's charter, on the ground that this
suit being for a conversion, the action was*in disaffirmance of
a contract that bound neither party. "The contract," said
Mr. Justice Lurton, "not having been immoral or contrary to
public policy, may be disaffirmed and suit brought for the
value of benefits which the other has received and retained
thereunder."
DAMAGES.

Where punitive and compensatory damages, in an action of
slander, have been awarded in a lump sum, and it is apparent
that the verdict is excessive, the court cannot,
Damages,
Compensatory, on the filing of a remittitur of the punitive
Remittitur
damages, apportion them, but must send the
whole case back for a new trial: Reid v. Keith (Supreme
Court of Wisconsin), 75 N. W. 392.
ELECTIONS.
The paster has been held again to invalidate the ballot, for
otherwise "the official ballot might become but
Ballot,
Pasters
little more than a convenient card upon which to
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paste private tickets, printed and circulated in secret: " Roberts
v. Quest (S. C. Ill.), 5o N. E. 1073.
EQUITY.

While the questions, what is a fact? and what is a conclusion of law ? have been frequently answered, and while exact
Demurrer,
rules have been laid down to distinguish a fact
Admission
from a conclusion of law, yet it has been recently
contended in the Supreme Court of New York that the
allegation in a complaint in equity, that the complainant has
no remedy at law is a fact within the rule that a demurrer
admits facts but not conclusions of law. The court took the
opposite view, however: Starbuck v. Farmers'Loan and Trust
Co. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division), 51 N. Y. Suppl. 8.
A demurrer having occured in the course of the pleadings
in Henriques v. Yale University (Supreme Court, Appellate
Demurrer,
Division), 51 N. Y. Suppl. 284, a question arose
Effect of
as to its effect under the Code. It was contended
that, under the common law judgment, one demurrer went
against the party in whose pleadings the first mistake occurred,
but it was also shown that no such rule obtained in equity.
It was held that the common law rule prevailed under the
Code.
A client placed certain notes in his attorney's hands for
safe-keeping and, at his death, his sole heir wrote the attorney
to take entire charge of her interests and pay himEquitable
Assignment, self out of the money he had in his hand. The
What
Supreme Court of Iowa, Foss v. Cobbler, 75 N. W.
Constitutes 516, held, in accordance with principle,
that this
did not amount to an equitable assignment of the fund because
it did not create an absolute personal indebtedness, payable at
all events. See Christmas v. Gaines, 14 Wall. 69; Fristv.
Child, 21 Wall. 441.
The English Court of Appeal has decided that the name,
"The North Cheshire and Manchester Brewing Company"
Trade Name, resembles " The Manchester Brewing Company"
New
too closely.for the companyto be allowed to trade
Company, under that name. In this case the Manchester
njunction Brewing Company obtained an injunction
to prevent the North Cheshire and Manchester Brewing Company,
which had just been started, from using the name adopted,
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even though there was no intention to deceive the public or to
injure the plaintiff's trade: Manchester Brewing Co., Ltd. v.
North Cheshire and Manchester Brewing Co., Ltd, [r898], I
Ch. 539.
EVIDENCE.

The subject of judicial notice is necessarily indefinite in its
limits, and in consequence it is not surprising to occasionally
find those limits very expansive. In a recent
Judicial
Notice,
case arising out of the question whether specificaTrinidad
tions for street paving calling for "best quality
Asphalt
Lake asphaltum " had been complied with, the
court said it would take notice that such language referred to
asphaltum Lake in Trininad, and that "there is an overflow
from that lake which spreads asphalt over the adjacent land:
Conde v. Schnectady (Supreme Court, Appellate Division), 51
N. Y. Suppl. 854.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In Flynn v. Flynn, 5o N. E. 65o, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held, in accordance with principle, that a wife's
DoweraRight dower is divested by a seizure of her husband's
Not an Estate land during her coverture by virtue of the right

of eminent domain. The court say, "There can be no doubt
that the inchoate right of the wife is always subject to any
incumbrance or infirmity in the husband's title existing at the
time he became seized, and we are also of opinion that it is
subject to any incident attached to it by law." Moore v. New
York, 8 N. Y. Iio, was followed, and Wheeler v. Kirtland,27
N. J. Eq. 534, which holds the converse of the principal case,
was disapproved by the court.
Dower is not an estate, but a mere inchoate right: Windham v. Partland,4 Mass. 384; Bullardv. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533;
People v. Palmer, io App. Div. (N. Y.) 395. A wife may not
assign her dower, Mason v. Mason, i4o Mass. 63; Reiff v.
Horst, 55 Md. 42; a deed purporting to convey it is void.
In Nauner v. Gray (Supreme Court, Appellate Division),
51 N. Y. Suppl. 222, a married woman employed an attorney
Separation, to secure her a separation from her husband.
Attorney's The attempt was unsuccessful and this action was

Fees
brought by the attorney to charge the husband
with the fee. In England it would seem such action is main-
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tainable whether the action be for divorce or merely for
separation. The court decided, after a review of authorities,
that in this country the attorney may collect from the husband when the action was for separation, but must in addition
" show affirmatively that the suit was for the protection and
support of the wife, and the conduct of the husband was such
as to render its institution and prosecution reasonable and
proper."
INNKEEPERS.

An officer in the German army came to New York, intending to remain some time, but not permanently. He got a
room in defendant's
Clothing,
When
Relation
Exists

house,

an

acknowledged

hotel, and engaged a room at the rate of $1.25
per week, though he did not agree to remain a
definite time. His clothing having disappeared
from the room, he seeks to enforce against de-

fendant an- innkeeper's liability. It was contended that the
nature of the agreement destroyed the relation of innkeeper
and guest, the plaintiff becoming a boarder or lodger. It has
been said that a guest is one who "comes without any bargain for time, remains without one, and may go when he
pleases, paying only for the actual entertainment which he
receives." But it appears by recent decisions, at least in New
York, "that a special agreement fixing in advance the price to
be paid, or the length of the stay, does not absolutely disturb
the relation of innkeeper and guest, and constitute the person
so acting a boarder or lodger." The court was of opinion
that considering together all the circumstances, the plaintiff's
connection abroad, the nature of the house, and the agreement
itself, the relation was that of innkeeper and guest: Metzger
v. Schnabel (Supreme Court, Appellate Division), 52 N. Y.
Suppl. 105.
LIBEL.

Palmer v. Matthews (Supreme Court, Appellate Division), 5 I
N. Y. Suppl. 839. The defendant, publisher of a daily paper,
having published an article in relation to plaintiff,
Witnesses,
the same article being published at the same time
CrossExamination by other papers, the plaintiff wrote a letter to
defendant demanding a retraction and compensation, and also
the statement that" I do not expect any one paper to bear it all,
but only its due proportion." During plaintiff's cross-examination in the suit subsequently brought by him, this letter
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was brought to his attention and, over his objection, he was
asked how many papers he had sued for the publication.
This was assigned as error and the ruling affirmed in spite of
the dissent of two judges who, in a very able opinion, contended that the fact of a contemporary publication is irrelevant,
as is also the fact of suits for such publications. There was,
apparently, much weight in the appellant's contention that the
jury had been influenced by this testimony in assessing
damages as they allowed but six cents, though on the other
evidence the plaintiff would seem to be entitled to substantial
damages. Odgers says in this connection: "Nor should the
fact, that other actions have been brought for other publications of the same libel, be taken into consideration by the jury
in assessing damages arising from the publication by the
present defendant," and further, "so is evidence (inadmissible)
*that other actions are pending against other persons for other
publications of the same libel: " Law of Slander and Libel,
pp. 298, 316. In Witches v. Jones, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 491, it is
said: "But evidence of contemporary publications by others
does not tend to disprove malice and is inadmissible." See
Folewell v. Journal Co., 37 Atl. 16 ; Smith v. Assoc., 5 C. C.
A. 91.
It has been decided by the Court of Appeals of New York,

People v. Morton, 5o N. E. 791, that the courts have not
power to issue a mandamus to the governor,
either alone or as one of a board of officers of
which he is a member by virtue of his office, requiring him
to perform any act, either purely ministerial or otherwise.
Vaun, J., thought the exemption should apply to the lieutenantgovernor also. O'Brien, J., dissented from the court's conclusion, holding that without the mandamus, statutes might be
abrogated at will by executive officers.
M',andamus to

Governor

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

The Supreme Conrt of New York, at trial term, has lately
considered a point which seems to have been unsettled in that
jurisdiction,, namely, that a lunatic is liable for
Defences,
Lunacy,
slander or libel.
Of course, this decision is
Actual Malice limited to cases where actual malice need not be
proved, excluding cases of privileged communications and
those where "smart money" is sought: Ullriic v. N. Y Press
-Co., 50 N. Suppl. 788.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

An employe was injured because of a defective stirrup strap
furnished him for use in the course of his employment. This
strap had been tested by the foreman in the emDefective
Appliances ploye's presence, and the latter had professed
himself satisfied that the strap was strong enough. Held, by
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that the employe assumed the risk, arid judgment for defendant affirmed: Davis
v. Forbes, 51 N. E. 20. Knowlton, J., delivered an exhaustive dissenting opinion, holding that the employe, by the
weight of evidence, did not fully understand and appreciate
the risk. " He was undoubtedly influenced by the statements
and representations of Abbott" (the foreman who had tested
the strap). " He saw Abbott pull upon it, but he did not
know how much force was applied in the pulling." Judge
Knowlton considers that the majority have invaded the
province of the jury. He cites, among others, Ferren v. R.,
143 Mass. 197 (1887); Fitzgerald v. Paper Co., I55 Mass.
155 (1891);
iIaloney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513 (892);
Tenanty v. Mfg. Co., 49 N. E. 654 (1898); Smitth v. Baker
(i89i), A. C. 325; Thoussell v. Handyside, 20 Q. B. D. 359
(1888); Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. 647 (887).
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has recently held
(Clannon v. Sandford Co., 40 At. 462), that where a servant
Liabilityto is sent to a place, some distance away, by his
Provide
master to work on a building, the master having
Safe Place to no control over the said building, but assuring the
Work
servant that it was a safe place,

and that the contractor in charge would see to it, the master was not liable for
failure on the part of the contractor in charge to provide the
servant with a safe staging on which to work, the duty of
providing a safe place being neither specially assumed nor
imposed by law in such a case. The court, while admitting
the rule in case the premises on which the servant works are
in the control of the master, held that the very reasons of the
rule fails where the premises are not under his control.
Andrews, C. J., dissented. It is held, on the same principle
that where the work upon which the servant is engaged is of
a nature to make the place where it is done temporarily insecure, the servant assumes the increased hazard: Gulf, C. S.
& F. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 65 Fed. 48; and that where the
servant does work at the direction of one who is without
authority, the master is under no duty to provide a safe place:
Goff v. Chippewa River Co., 86 Wis. 237.
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NEGLIGENCE.

The law of negligence seems to have been applied to a novel
state of facts in Selover v. Sheardown, 76 N. W. 5o (Supreme
a
Clerk of Court Court of Minnesota), where it was held that
court clerk who negligently gave misinformation
to a suitor relative to his cause, was liable to the suitor for
loss sustained as the result of the clerk's negligence.
Prior to the Act of 1869 (Rev. St. I874, p. 814) it had been
held in Illinois that a duty devolved on the owner of land
Fires Set by adjacent to a railway track to keep his premises
Locomotive, free from combustible matter to avoid the spread
Contributory of fire set by locomotives.
The act referred to
Negligence provides that "it shall not in any case be considered as negligence on the part of the owner or occupant of
the property injured that he has used the same in the manner,
or permitted the same to be used, or remain in the condition,
it would have been used or remained, had no railroad passed
through or near the property so injured." Under this statute
held not contributory negligence to leave combustible matter
near the right of way: Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. v. Stephens
(S. C. Ill.), 5 1 N. E. 6 9 .
A platform of the B. Ry. connected with a freight house
used mostly for storing oil, was saturated with oil leaking
from barrels which had been left there longer than
Fire,
storage of O11, the 48 hours allowed by law (Pub. St. of Mass.,
Remote Cause C. 102, § 74). A teamster not connected with B
brought goods for shipping, and in lighting his pipe threw a
match on the ground underneath the platform, which immediately caught fire. As a result the buildings of plaintiff were
destroyed. This probably would not have occured if the oil
had not been on the platform. Held, that B could not have
apprehended the result, which was only remotely an effect of
the negligence and judgment for B affirmed. Knowlton, J.,
dissented on the ground that violation of the statute was negligence per se, since the very raison dRtre of the act was to
reduce the liability to such accidents. The learned judge
cannot "see what negligence on the part of defendant could
have been found except its failure to anticipate and guard
against such a danger." The majority say "illegality on the
part of a defendant does not of itself create a liability for
remote consequences: " Stone v. Boston & A. R. (S. C. Mass.),
51 N. E.i.
The view taken by the dissenting justice is supported by"
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Pollock, who holds that " ' the commission of an act specifically
forbidden by law, or the omission or failure to perform any
duty specifically imposed by law, is generally equivalent to
an act done with intent to cause wrongful injury. When the
harm that ensues from the unlawful act or omission is the very
kind of harm which it was the aim of the law to prevent (and
this is the commonest case), the justice and necessity of this
rule are manifest without further comment. . . . Even if the
mischief to be prevented is not such as an ordinary man
would foresee as the probable consequences of disobedience,
there is some default in the mere fact that the law is disobeyed;
at any rate a court of law cannot admit discussion on that
point; and the defaulter must take the consequences."
See
Webbs' Pollock on Torts, p. 24, and cases there cited.
What amounts to contributory negligence in a passenger of
a vehicle threatened by a sudden danger is a question to which
Passenger's it is difficult to apply the test of the "prudent man"
Contributory and the courts, recognizing its difficulty, have
Negligence
been loath to deal with it strictly. In Podsen v.
Nassau Electric R. Co. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division),
5 1 N. Y. Suppl. 933, it appeared that plaintiff was a passenger
on a car of defendant line; that, suddenly, a flame from two to
-six feet high shot out of the motor-box and continued while
the car ran a distance of one hundred feet. Frightened by the
flame, the plaintiff jumped from the car while it was moving
and was hurt. The defendant insisted that the fact that other
passengers remained seated, conclusively established contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part, but the court took the
opposite view, for which it was affirmed on appeal.
A borough or municipality is liable for any injury resulting
from neglect in supervising the adjustment and regulation of
the electric wires suspended over its streets, and
Telephone
the fact that the company owning the wire may be
ire,
Repair,
liable also, does not have any effect on the liability
Borough, of the municipality: Mooney v. Borough of Luzerne,
Liability
40 Atl. (Pa.) 31 I. The court refers
to the dictum
in West Clester v. Apple, 35 Pa. 284 (I86o), which seems to
imply a contrary view, and remarks upon the fact that it was
disapproved in Philadel.hiav. Swnith, 16 Atl. (Pa.) 493 (1889).
Therefore, when a telephone wire which had been used for
fifteen years in safety, was abandoned and cut by the borough,
so that one.end sagged within reach of a pedestrian, who was
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injured by an electric shock resulting from the crossing of the
telephone wire with an electric wire, the question of the
borough's negligence was for the jury.

PARTIES.

That the laws of a primitive people would not fit the needs
of a highly civilized people is perfectly patent. The converse
of that proposition might be supported with some
Indians,
Tribal Name degree of success by the case of fontauk Tribe of
Indians v. Long Island R. Co. (Supreme Court, Appellate
Division), 5' N. Y. Suppl. 142. The railroad company
having occupied tribal lands, an action was brought for their
recovery in the name of the "Montauk Tribe of Indians, by
Wyandank Pharoah, their chief and king." The right to sue
in such a form was, of course, denied. The court suggested,
though in a manner implying doubt, that possibly an action
might be maintained by one of the tribe on behalf of the rest.
If that course should fail, the indians would be driven to the
expedient of suing as individuals. But, then, the question
would arise, What individuals ? Does the land belong to
families or to individuals? If it belongs to families, shall only
the heads be joined? If, on the other hand, not families, but
individuals are to be considered in determining ownership,
what individuals are to be made plaintiffs? Are the females
of the tribe to be considered? At what age does the individual
become an owner? These and similar questions would have
to be answered by an investigation of tribal law, the possible
difficulties of which may be easily imagined.

PARTNERSHIP.

The Supreme Court of Alabama has again announced its
adherence to the so-called English rule, that a retiring partner
Dissolution, is not discharged by an extension of time granted
Liability of by the creditor to the continuing partners : BranRetiring
nurn v. Wertheimer-Schwartz Shoe Co., 23 S. E.
Partner
639, following Bank v. Cheney, 1i4 Ala. 536
(1896). The American courts are divided on the question,
many of them following the rule above given. For full citations of cases see Bates on Partnership, §§ 533-534; George
on Partnership, p. 27 1.
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REAL PROPERTY.

That a lease may prove a snare for the unwary tenant is
not a fact of recent discovery, but its truth has been well
proven in a late case. The defendant leased
Rent lIn
Advance,
premises of the plaintiff for a year, the rent to be
Eviction
payable monthly in advance. The instalment for
September being due on the first day of that month and
unpaid, the lessor took summary proceedings to recover possession, and on the eighth of September the tenant moved out.
The landlord then sued for rent for the month of September
and the defendant pleaded the dispossession before the expiration of the month. The plaintiff was allowed to recover:
Bernstein v. Heineman (Supreme Court, Appellate Division),
51 N. Y. Suppl. 467.
A divided court lately decided that notice to a landlord of
a defect in part of an appliance furnished for the use of tenants
Injury to
Tenant,
Landlord's
Liability

puts him on inquiry as to the safety of the rest of

the appliance. The appliance was a platform
covered with slats, upon which tenants stood when
hanging washed clothes.. The defendant had been

notified that some of the slats were rotten, but the accident to
the plaintiff occurred on another part of the platform. This
fact, however, did not relieve the landlord, as the previous
notice made it his duty to render the whole platform safe:
Rouillon v. Wilson (Supreme Court, Appellate Division), 5 I
N. Y. Suppl. 430.
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Sweetland v. Chicago
& G. T. Ry. Co., 75 N. W. io66, by a divided court, has
Statutory

adopted the rule followed in most jurisdictions,

Right of
Action and

is made by statute to survive, and there is, also, a

Statutory

that where the right of action for personal injuries

Remedy for

statutory remedy given the heirs for the pecuniary

Concurrent

the person injured, two actions cannot be brought.

Loss not

loss suffered by them, by reason of the death of

It is said that the legislature cannot have meant to give two
suits for the same cause of action.
This construction has been given to Lord Campbell's act in
England, where a mother was refused an action in the nature
of a solatium for her son's death, to be tried concurrently with
the action which survived by virtue of Lord Campbell's act:
Wood v. Gray (1892), App. Cas. 576. And, in general, it is
held that such acts do not create a new cause of action but
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that the same cause of action which deceased had, survives:
Read v. Railway Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555; Hill v. Railroad
Co., 35 At. 997 (1896); McCarthy v. Ry. Co., 18 Kan.
46 (1877); Hurlzrt v. City of Topeka, 34 Fed. 510 (1888).
But see, contra, Needham v. Railway Co., 38 Vt. 294 (1865);
Bowes v. City of Boston, 155 Mass. 344 (1892) ; Railroad Co.
v. Pizillips, 64 Miss. 6g3 (I887); HIydrick v. fZavigation Co.,
30 Pac. 714 (1892).
TAXATION.

A foreign insurance company did business in the State of
New Jersey, it having submitted itself to the laws governing
From time to time its
foreign corporations.
Money
In Transit,
agent in Newark received money for premiums
Foreign
which he deposited in bank, in his name as superCorporation intendent, and at the end of each week transmitted
the entire amount so collected to the home office. The
weekly average was $45oo, and no use was made of the
money in the State of New Jersey. The assessors of taxes
assessed this bank balance as personal property of the corporation, taxable as property of the foreign corporation, and
the company appealed. Held, that the tax was wrongly imposed as the money was merely in transit, and its deposit in
New Jersey was nothing more than an act of convenient
transmission: State (Met. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.) v. Mfayor,
ete., of Newark (Supreme Court of New Jersey), 4o Atl. 573.

